2007. An Institutional Theory Of Sanctions Onse... · Extended & Working

Beyond success rates, the paper explores why certain states are targeted in the first place:

: For sanctions to work, they must create enough political pressure on the leader's "winning coalition"—the essential group of supporters needed to stay in power. 2007. An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onse...

More likely against democratic targets; less likely against autocracies. Beyond success rates, the paper explores why certain

The 2007 article "," published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution by David Lektzian and Mark Souva , argues that the effectiveness and initiation of economic sanctions depend heavily on the political institutions of the target state. Core Argument: The "Winning Coalition" Core Argument: The "Winning Coalition" : In democracies,

: In democracies, leaders rely on a large coalition. Economic pain felt by the broader public directly threatens the leader's support base, making them more likely to concede.

Democracies are more frequent senders and tend to target those most vulnerable to economic pressure.

The authors utilize the Selectorate Theory to explain why sanctions often fail against autocracies but are more effective against democracies: